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Japan, 101-8360.1 Introduction
This paper studies ﬁrms’ exploitation of renewable natural resources in a
dynamic setting. We present a diﬀerential game to examine oligopolistic
ﬁrms’ harvesting behavior in a continuous time inﬁnite horizon model. Al-
though diﬀerential games have been widely used in the economics literature,
it is well known that ﬁnding feedback equilibrium is extremely diﬃcult except
linear-quadratic games. Nevertheless, for models of exploitation of renewable
natural resources, we need to analyze games that are not linear-quadratic
since reasonable growth functions regarding the stock of natural resources
are not linear. In this paper, we present a diﬀerential game model that is
not linear-quadratic and derive Markov feedback equilibrium for the game.
One prominent feature of the model is that demand for harvest of a natural
resource is assumed to depend upon the stock of the natural resource.
I no u rm o d e l ,w ec o n s i d e rt w os e t t i n g sr e g a r d i n gﬁrms’ harvesting deci-
s i o n s .O n es e t t i n gi st h ec a s ew h e r et h eﬁrms make their decision noncoop-
eratively and the other is the one where the ﬁrms can cooperate. For the
noncooperative case, the ﬁrms are assumed to undertake Cournot competi-
tion in the product market.
I nt h ec o n t e x to fﬁshery economics, Levhari and Mirman (1980) examine
competition of harvesting in a dynamic setting. They study utility maxi-
mization, but do not consider proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms. In this paper, we
will analyze a dynamic oligopolistic model of a renewable natural resource
that is not linear-quadratic. We will examine feedback strategies and under
certain conditions, derive Markov perfect equilibrium. We will also discuss
the existence and the multiplicity of open-loop Nash equilibrium. In general,
there can be multiple open-loop Nash equilibria.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we will describe the ba-
sic model. In Section 3, we examine Markov feedback strategies and derive
Markov perfect equilibrium. In Section 4, we will examine open-loop Nash
equilibrium for games both under the case of noncooperation and under the
case of cooperation. In Section 5, we discuss the eﬀe c t so ft a x a t i o no ne q u i -
librium exploitation of the renewable natural resource. Section 6 concludes.
12 The Model
There are n ﬁrms in the industry, indexed by i ∈ I = {1,···,n}. The ﬁrms
harvest a renewable natural resource and sell them in the product market.
We assume that the ﬁrms engage in Cournot competition in the product
market.
Let g(X) be the growth function of the natural resource. We assume
g(0) = 0,g( e X)=0for some ˜ X>0,g
0
(0) > 0, and g
00
(X) < 0.








The initial stock of the natural resource is denoted
X(0) = X0.












where p is the price of the product, xi the harvest as well as the product of
ﬁrm i,a n dX the stock of the renewable natural resource.
Note that demand for the product depends on the stock of the natural
resource. In other words, we assume that consumers are concerned with the











2T h eo b j e c t i v eo fe a c hﬁrm is to maximize the discounted sum of its proﬁts
over an inﬁnite time horizon. Let r be a common discount rate. Then the






3 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
In this section, we consider feedback strategies. In particular, we examine
Markov feedback strategies. Feedback strategies and Markov perfect equilib-
rium are deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 The feedback strategy space for ﬁrm i is the set
S
F
i = {xi(X,t) is continuous in (X,t), xi(X,t) ≥ 0,a n dX ≥ 0}.
Deﬁnition 2 A Markov perfect equilibrium is a pair of feedback strategies
(x∗
i,x ∗







−i) for every xi ∈ S
F
i .
In order to derive a closed form solution, we assume that the inverse











X2 ,a > 0,b > 0. (3)
We also assume that the cost function takes the following form:
C(X)=
¯ c − γ lnX
X
, ¯ c>0, γ > 0. (4)
Note that C0(X) > 0 and C00(X) < 0.
F u r t h e r m o r ew ea s s u m et h a tt h eg r o w t hf u n c t i o no ft h es t o c kl e v e lo ft h e
natural resource takes the following form:
g(X)=X(α − β lnX), α > 0, β > 0. (5)
In what follows, we consider the case of two ﬁrms, i.e., we assume n =2 .
Then we have the following theorem.




a − ¯ c − F +( γ − G)lnX
3b
• X,
where G and F are given in (16) and (17), and 3bβ − 2γ +2 G<0.
Proof: First let Y ≡ lnX and yi ≡
xi
X.
Then the objective function of ﬁrm i may be rewritten as
Z ∞
0
[a − (yi + yj) − (¯ c − γY )]yie
−rtdt. (6)
Also the growth function may be rewritten as
˙ X
X






˙ Y = α − βY − (yi + yj),i , j=1 , 2,i 6= j. (7)
Let V i(X) be the value function for ﬁrm i. Then the system of Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation becomes
rV
i(Y )=m a x
yi
½
[a − b(yi + yj) − (¯ c − γY )]yi +
dV i(Y )
dY
[α − βY − (yi + yj)]
¾
(8)









where c(Y ) ≡ ¯ c − γY.
Now we assume that the value function is symmetric. Suppose that the
value function takes the following form:












a − c(Y ) − {F + GY }
3b
. (11)
Substituting (9), (10) and (11) into (8), we get
r
·
















a − c(Y ) − F − GY
3b
¾
+(F + GY )
·
g(Y ) − 2
½





L ≡ a − ¯ c − F and M ≡ γ − G.




2 − γM − βG +2 GM =0 , (13)
rF − (a − ¯ c)M +4 bLM − γL − βF − αG +2 GL +2 FM =0 , (14)
and
rE − (a − ¯ c)L +2 bL
2 − αF +2 FL=0 . (15)
It follows from (13), (14) and (15) that we obtain
G =
(9br − 18bβ +1 0 γ) ±
p




(a − ¯ c)(2γ − 5G)+9 bαG







(a − ¯ c)L − 2bL





3bβ + γ − 3
2br ±
q
(3bβ + γ − 3
2br)2 +8 bγ(r − 2β)
8b
. (19)
Next substituting (11) into (7) yields









{a − ¯ c − F} − α =0 . (20)
A particular solution to the diﬀerential equation (20) is
Y =
2(a − ¯ c − F) − 3bα
3bβ − 2γ +2 G
.
Then the solution of (20) is
Y (t)=Y +( Y0 − Y )e{
3bβ−2γ+2G
3b }t. (21)
We must have 3bβ − 2γ +2 G<0 in order that this state trajectory is
asymptotically stable.
We note that when β > 0, we must have M>0. Therefore G<γ.
4 Open-loop Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we consider open-loop strategies. Open-loop strategies and
open-loop Nash equilibrium are deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 4 The open-loop strategy space for ﬁrm i is the set
Si = {xi(t):xi(t) is piecewise continuous and xi(t) ≥ 0 for every t}.
Deﬁnition 5 An open-loop Nash equilibrium is an open-loop strategy selec-
tion x∗ =( x∗
i,x ∗







−i), for ∀xi ∈ Si.
First, we consider the case where the ﬁrms choose harvesting strategies
noncooperatively.











The current value Hamiltonian for ﬁrm i is then given by







where λi is a costate variable.
Let fX ≡
∂f






xi + f − C(X) − λi =0 , (24)
























−rtλi =0 . (26)
Summing equation (24) over i, we get
f
0 X
xi + n(f − C(X)) −
X
λi =0 . (27)
Let Q =
P
xi. Then equation (27) may be rewritten as
f
0
Q + n(f − C(X)) −
X
λi =0 . (28)
Diﬀerentiate (28) with respect to time, we have
f
00
( ˙ Q + ˙ X)Q + f









˙ λi =0 . (29)
7Recall that
˙ X = g(X) −
X
xi

































Thus (29) may be rewritten as
f
00
( ˙ Q + g(X) − Q)Q + f


















(X) − fX)Q =0 .
H e n c ew eh a v e
˙ Q(f


















It follows from (32) that
˙ Q (33)
=
f00Q2 − fXQ + {(n − 1)C0 + f00g − nf
0 +( r − g
0)f0}Q
f00Q +( n +1 ) f0
+
(r − g
0)n(f − C) − n(f0g − C0g)
f00Q +( n +1 ) f0 .
8Recall that the inverse demand function is


















Let the left hand side of (34) be Ψ(X,Q).
F i r s tn o t et h a tt h e r ee x i s t s ˇ X>0 such that Ψ( ˇ X,0) = 0. Note also that,









In what follows, we assume that
dQ
dX > 0 and that Q = Φ(X) solves (34).
Then, at the steady state, i.e., ˙ Q =0and ˙ X =0 , we see that there exists
an open-loop Nash equilibrium harvest Q∗ and the stock level X∗ such that
Φ(X∗)=g(X∗).
Note that g0(X∗) T 0. It may be possible that there exist more than one
equilibrium.
We have so far analyzed the case where the ﬁrms choose their strategies
noncooperatively. Now we consider the case where the ﬁrms cooperate when
they harvest the natural resources.


























where ξ is a costate variable.







xi + f − C(X) − ξ =0 , (37)




























−rtξ =0 . (39)









˙ xi) − C
0 ˙ X − ˙ ξ =0 . (40)














It follows from (41) that we have
˙ Q =
f











f00Q + f0 . (42)


















(f − C) − C
0g =0 . (43)










10In what follows, we assume that
dQ
dX > 0 and that Q = φ(X) solves (43).
Then, at the steady state, i.e., ˙ Q =0and ˙ X =0 , we see that there exists
an open-loop Nash equilibrium harvest Q∗ and the stock level X∗ such that
φ(X∗)=g(X∗).
Note that g0(X∗) T 0. It may be possible that there exist more than one
equilibrium.
5 Taxation
In this section, we will examine eﬀects of taxation on equilibrium harvest.
We consider a speciﬁc tax whose rate depends upon the stock of the natural
resource. Let θ
X be a tax rate, and θ ≥ 0.T h u s , g i v e n θ, the smaller the
stock of the natural resource, the higher the tax rate. The objective function










For Markov perfect equilibrium, we have
y
∗ =







Therefore if the tax rate increases, then the equilibrium harvest rate will
decrease.















where µi is a costate variable.
Then the necessary conditions for an open-loop Nash equilibrium are
f
0xi + f − C −
θ
X
− µi =0 , (46)




























−rtµi =0 . (48)




X2 − fX − nf
0




































(r − g0 + f − C00) nθ






6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have studied ﬁrms’ exploitation of renewable natural re-
sources in a dynamic setting. We have constructed a diﬀerential game to
examine oligopolistic ﬁrms’ harvesting in a continuous time inﬁnite horizon
model. For models of exploitation of renewable natural resources, we have
analyzed a game that is not linear-quadratic and derived Markov perfect
equilibrium for the game.
12In the model, we have considered two settings regarding ﬁrms’ harvesting
decisions. One setting is the case where the ﬁrms make their decision nonco-
operatively and the other is the one where they can cooperate. We have also
analyzed open-loop Nash equilibrium for the games both under the case of
noncooperation and under that of cooperation. We have also examined the
eﬀects of taxation on equilibrium exploitation of the natural resource.
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